

## An Investigation of Iraqi Fourth-Year University Students' Recognition of Presupposition Through The Linguistic Triggers

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المستخلص

ان الافتراض هو الاعتقاد المسبق المعروف من قبل كل من المتكلم والمخاطب ، وهو يرتبط بتراكيب لغوية معينة تعمل كمؤشرات لوجوده في الجمل . تهدف الدراسة الحالية الى التحقق من ان طلبة السنة الرابعة العراقيين قادرين على تمييز وجود الافتراض في الجمل الانكليزية من خلال معنى هذه المؤشرات اللغوية ، ومن اجل التحقق من هدف الدراسة تم اجراء اختبار على هؤلاء الطلبة . لقد اثبتت النتائج المستحصلة من الاختبار ان الطلبة قادرين على تمييز الافتراض من خلال وجود هذه التراكيب اللغوية (المؤشرات) لقياسها بدور مهم في التأشير على وجوده مما يدعم صحة الفرضية الموضوعية .

### **Abstract:**

Presupposition is the background belief that is known by both the speaker and the addressee, it is tied to particular words and aspects of the surface structure that act as linguistic triggers. The present study aims at investigating whether Iraqi fourth -year university students are able to recognize the English presuppositions through the meaning of these linguistic triggers .To fulfil the basic requirements of the study, the researcher has conducted a test . The results of the study have validated the hypothesis of the work and it is found that the linguistic triggers are important tools in recognizing presuppositions.

### **Section One: Preliminaries**

#### **1.1 The problem:**

Speakers assume certain information is already known by their listeners. And since it is treated as known such information is generally not to be stated and consequently will count as part of what is communicated but not said. The technical terms presupposition and entailment are used to describe two different aspects of this kind of information. (Yule, 1996:25)

The presupposition is something that the speaker assumes to be the case prior to making an utterance. It differs from the entailment, which follows from what is asserted in the utterance. The presupposition is an assumption by a speaker / writer about what is true or already known by a listener / reader. (Yule 1985:248)

The present study concentrates on the aspect of presupposition rather than entailment.

What is so special about presupposition is that it seems to be tied to particular words, or aspects of surface structure in general, which are called “presupposition triggers” such triggers as Kadmon (2001:10) states “**are responsible for presupposition**”.

It is hoped that by the existence of such linguistic triggers the recognition of the presuppositions of the sentences becomes easier.

### **1.2 The Hypothesis:**

It is hypothesized that Iraqi fourth -year university students have the ability to recognize the English presuppositions through the meaning of the linguistic triggers of these presuppositions.

### **1.3 The Aim of the Study:**

The aim of the study is to check whether Iraqi fourth- year college students are able to recognize the presuppositions of the English sentences through the meaning of the linguistic triggers of such presuppositions.

### **1.4 Limits of the study:**

This study will be limited to Iraqi fourth- year university students in the department of Translation, College of Arts, Al-Mustansiriya University, during the academic year 2011-2012.

### **1.5 The significance of the study:**

The present study sheds light on an important part of the English language which is the subject of presupposition. Presuppositions can be used not only to understand and manage the meanings behind the English sentences but also to communicate more effectively and to understand the English language and the English culture in a better way.

## ***Section Two: Review of Literature***

### **2.1 Introduction:**

Presupposition: is the relation between propositions by which (a) presupposes (b) if, for (a) to have a truth-value (b) must be true. Thus, in one analysis, “*the king of France is bald*” is neither true nor false unless the presupposed “*there is a king of France*” is true. The term *presupposition* developed in philosophy by P.f. Strawson; thence into linguistics in the late 1960s, where used in ways increasingly closer to its ordinary sense, of sentences and of utterances instancing them. E.g. “*I’m sorry John is not here*” presupposes “John is not here”; also that this is known to an addressee or addressees. “*I apologize for calling you a communist*” presupposes that (in the belief of the speaker or the addressee or both) being a communist is bad, and so on. Distinctions were commonly drawn between “semantic presuppositions”, e.g. of “the king of France is bald” or of the sentence “*the king of France is bald*”, and “pragmatic

presuppositions” which either held in particular contexts or otherwise fell outside a restricted definition of \*semantics. (Oxford concise dictionary of linguistics (2007: 317))

According to Langendoen (1979:214) “The study of presupposition has been fraught with disagreements and disputes ever since it was first undertaken, ninety years ago, by Gottlob Frege. Linguists have been interested in its study, but their disputes and disagreements have been no less vigorous than those of philosophers. The very existence of presupposition as a property of sentences, distinct from entailment and implicature, is in dispute. Assuming that it exists, there is disagreement over whether to analyze it as a semantic or as a pragmatic notion, and over how to provide a suitable recursive definition for it (i.e. how to solve the projection problem for presuppositions).

Karttunen (1973:169) argues that “in spite of the bumper crop of papers on presuppositions in books and journals, presupposition itself still remains a very unclear concept. And there are two basic types of definitions for this mysterious term: for some scholars, such as the logician Bas Van Fraassen (1968, 1969, and 1971), presupposition is a *semantic* notion, defined in terms of truth and consequence. According to Van Fraassen, sentence **A** semantically presupposes another sentence **B**, just in case **B** is true whenever **A** is either true or false. In other words, the truth of **B** is a *condition for the bivalence* of **A**. If **A** presupposes **B** and **B** is false, then **A** is neither true nor false: it is without truth value or has some third indeterminate truth value. In this sense, presupposition is a semantic relation between two sentences; it does not directly involve the speaker or the listener or the context in which the sentence is uttered. People do not presuppose anything, only sentences do. The other concept of presupposition, discussed by Keenan (1971) and Stalnaker (1970) is a *pragmatic* notion and involves both the speaker and the listener. According to the pragmatic conception, the speaker, rather than the sentence he utters, has presuppositions. To presuppose something as a speaker is to take its truth for granted and to assume the audience does the same. Strictly speaking, it would be meaningless to talk about the pragmatic presuppositions of a sentence. Such locutions are, however, justified in a secondary sense. A phrase like “the sentence **A** pragmatically presupposes **B**” can be understood as an abbreviation for “whenever **A** is uttered sincerely, the speaker of **A** presupposes **B** (i.e. assumes **B** and believes that his audience assumes **B** as well)”.

Karttunen (ibid: 170) states that “if I understand Keenan and Stalnaker correctly, pragmatic presuppositions (in this secondary sense) are to be thought of as *sincerity conditions* for the utterance of a sentence. It may be useful in this connection to use the term “linguistic context of an utterance” for the set of assumptions that the speaker of the utterance thinks he shares with his intended audience. Thus we can say that, in determining what the pragmatic presuppositions of a given sentence are, we thereby define a class of linguistic contexts in which it could be sincerely uttered”.

Levinson (1983:175) suggests that “the simplest view of semantic presupposition would be based on the following definition:

*A sentence A semantically presupposes another sentence B if:*

- (a) *In all situations where **A** is true, **B** is true.*  
 (b) *In all situations where **A** is false, **B** is true.*

Or equivalently, in the light of entailment definition :( ***A** semantically entails **B** (written  $A \Vdash B$ ) if every situation that makes **A** true, makes **B** true (or: in all worlds in which **A** is true **B** is true) and assuming a definition of negation (where if a sentence is neither true nor false, its negation is also neither true nor false):*

*A sentence **A** semantically presupposes a sentence **B** if:*

- (a)  $A \Vdash B$   
 (b)  $\sim A \Vdash B$  ( $\sim$  negation)

While the definition of “pragmatic presupposition” utilize two basic concepts in particular: appropriateness (or felicity) and mutual knowledge (or common ground, or joint assumption) in the way indicated in the following definition:

*An utterance **A** pragmatically presupposes a proposition **B** if **A** is appropriate only if **B** mutually known by participants. (Ibid: 204-5)*

Levinson (ibid:225) concludes that “presupposition remains , ninety years after Frege’s remarks on the subject , still only partially understood , and an important ground for the study of how semantics and pragmatics interact”.

Givon (1979a:50) (cited in Brown and Yule, 1983:29) notes that “ pragmatic presupposition is defined in terms of assumptions the speaker makes about what the hearer is likely to accept without challenge ”.

Yule (1985:248) defines presupposition as “an assumption by a speaker/ writer about what is true or already known by the listener/ reader”.

Yule (1996:133) presents the term as “something that the speaker assumes to be true”.

According to Verschueren (1999:30) “ presuppositions are relations between a form of expression and an implicit meaning which can be arrived at by a process of (pragmatic) inference i.e. the process of inferring meaning in a way that can not be imagined without taking contextual information into account) ”.

Van Dijk (1976:74) states that “the usual definition of presupposition, taken as a relation between sentences or propositions (with their interpretations), either belong to semantics or pragmatics. In the first case, it is given in terms of logical consequence or necessitation relations. In the second case, it is based on conditions for the appropriate use of uttered sentences”.

Karttunen (1973:170) refers to the fact that “there is no conflict between the semantic and the pragmatic concepts of presuppositions. They are related, albeit different notions. Consequently, it is easy to get confused”.

For example:

1- a. A: All of Jack’s children are bald.

B: Jack has children.

- b. A: Bill doesn't know that baldness is heredity.  
B: Baldness is hereditary.
- c. A: Fred has stopped beating his wife.  
B: Fred has been beating his wife.
- d. A: Fred no longer resents Zelda's infidelity.  
B: Zelda has been unfaithful.

All of the **B** sentences are traditionally regarded as presuppositions associated with the corresponding **A** sentences. It does not seem to matter much whether we consider them to be semantic or pragmatic presuppositions. If we take the semantic point of view, we mean that, for example, the sentence **A** in (1a) is indeterminate (= nonbivalent = neither true nor false) under all valuations that assign falsehood to **B**. If we adopt the pragmatic notion, we mean that the **A**-sentence can be sincerely uttered only in situations where the truth of the **B**-sentence is taken for granted, that is, **B** is part of the linguistic context in which **A** is uttered. Under one concept, presuppositions are conditions on bivalence, under the other notion they are sincerity conditions.

Karttunen also believes that "it would seem very desirable to find a formal way to link the two notions of presupposition with each other. So far that has not been achieved, although suggestive proposals have been made. For example Stalnaker makes the observation that, in general, if **A** semantically presupposes **B**, then **B** is always a pragmatic presupposition of **A** as well, although the converse does not always". (Ibid: 170-171)

Karttunen thinks that "the two notions, in particular the concept of semantic presupposition, still have not been given satisfactory definitions". (Ibid)

## 2.2 How to test Presuppositions:

According to Yule (1985:117-8) "One of the tests used to check for the presupposition underlying sentences involves negating a sentence with particular presupposition and checking if the presupposition remains true. Whether you say "*my car is a wreck*" or the negative version "*my car is not a wreck*", the underlying presupposition (*I have a car*) remains true despite the fact that the two sentences have opposite meanings. This is called "constancy under negation" test for identifying a presupposition. If someone says "*I used to regret marrying him, but I don't regret marrying him now*", the presupposition (*I married him*) remained constant even though the verb '*regret*' changes from affirmative to negative".

"Constancy under negation" is quality of the presupposition of the statement remaining true when the statement is negated. (Yule, 1996:128)

Palmer (1981:167) states that "it has been further claimed that presupposition can be defined logically, in that presuppositions are "constant under negation" (Kiparsky and Kiparsky, 1971:351: they are logically implied by both a positive sentence and its negative counterpart). Thus "*the king of France is bald*" and "*the king of France is not bald*" are said to presuppose that (*there is a king of France*)".

Levinson (1983:168) says that "...the technical sense of presupposition is restricted to certain pragmatic inferences or assumptions that seem at least to be built into linguistic expressions and which can be isolated using specific linguistic tests (especially traditionally, constancy under negation)".

Keenan (1971:45) (cited in Brown and Yule, 1983:29) describes the notion of logical presupposition in the following way:

*A sentence S logically presupposes a sentence S' just in case S logically implies S' and the negation of S, ~S, also logically implies S'.*

For example:

- 2- a. my uncle is coming home from Canada.
- b. my uncle isn't coming home from Canada.
- c. I have an uncle.

Following Keenan's definition, we can say that (2a) logically presupposes (2c) because of constancy under negation.

In opposition with Keenan; Brown and Yule (1983:29-30) argue that "it seems rather unnecessary to introduce the negative sentence (2b) into consideration of the relationship between (2a) and (2c). Though it may not be common knowledge that the speaker has an uncle, it is what Grice (1981:190) terms 'noncontroversial' information. Moreover, since the speaker chose to say "*my uncle*" rather than "*I have an uncle and he...*" we must assume he did not feel the need to assert the information. What he appears to be asserting is that this person is "*coming home from Canada*". Given this assertion, the idea that we should consider the *denial* of this assertion in order to find out whether there is a presupposition in what the speaker has not asserted seems particularly counterintuitive."

They add "the introduction of the negative sentence (2b) into consideration of (2a) creates an additional problem. For example, it has been suggested (cf. Kempson, 1975) that a sentence such as (2d) is a perfectly reasonable sentence of English and undermines the argument for logical presupposition, as it is defined above.

2d. My uncle isn't coming home from Canada because I don't have an uncle.

Sentences like (2d) always seem typical of utterances made by a speaker to deny another speaker's presupposition in a rather aggressive way. Yet the circumstances in which (2d) might be uttered are likely to be quite different from those in which the first sentence was uttered. The speakers, it could be suggested, would have different presuppositions, in the two situations. If we rely on a notion of speaker, or pragmatic, presupposition, we can simply treat (2c) as a presupposition in uttering (2a). Sentences (2b) and (2d) do not come into consideration at all".

In the same stream Palmer (1981:167-8) states that there is, however, one serious problem with the negation test "It is possible to negate the sentence in order to deny the presupposition. Although "*John wasn't worried by his wife's infidelity*" is usually taken to presuppose that his wife was unfaithful, it could be used to suggest she was not unfaithful, as

shown by the extended sentence “*John wasn’t worried by his wife’s infidelity, because she had not in fact been unfaithful*”.

In support of a view that hearers behave as if speakers’ presuppositions are to be accepted, there is the rather disturbing evidence from Loftus’ study (1975) of answers to leading questions. After watching a film of a car accident some subjects were asked the two questions in (3):

- 3- a. How fast was car A going when it turned right?
- b. Did you see a stop sign?

We can note that one of the speaker-presuppositions in asking (3a) is that “*car turned right*”. A number (35%) answered yes to question (3b). Another group of subjects were asked the questions in (4).

- 4- a. How fast was car A going when it ran the stop sign?
- b. Did you see a stop sign?

One of the speaker-presuppositions in asking (4a) is that “*car A ran the stop sign*”. In this situation, a significantly larger group (53%) answered yes to question (4b). It is worth noting that a number of subjects did not answer the (b) question in terms of truth or falsehood of fact, but according to what the speaker, in asking the preceding question, has appeared to presuppose. Brown and Yule (1983:30)

However Palmer (1981:196) refers to the fact that “... presuppositions appear to be constant, not only under negation, but also under question. Thus “*is the king of France bald?*” and “*was John worried by his wife’s infidelity?*” presuppose that (*there is a king of France*) and that (*John’s wife unfaithful*) ...the same presuppositions hold for the negative questions “*isn’t the king of France bald?*” and “*wasn’t John worried by his wife’s infidelity?*” They also hold, moreover, for suggestions, commands, invitations, e.g. “*let’s visit the king of France*” or “*don’t talk to John about his wife’s infidelity*”.

### 2.3 Problematic Characteristics of Presuppositions:

According to Levinson (ibid: 185-6) “constancy under negation is not in fact a rich enough definition to pick out a coherent, homogenous set of inferences. However presuppositions do exhibit a further set of distinguishing characteristics. Presuppositions seem to have the following properties:

- *They are defeasible in (a)certain contexts (b)certain intra-sentential contexts;*
- *They are apparently tied to particular aspects of surface structure.*

The first property will prove to be undoing of any possible semantic theory, while the second property may serve to distinguish presuppositions from the conversational implicatures, the other major of pragmatic inference”.

### 2.3.1 Defeasibility:

“One of the peculiar things about presuppositions is that they are liable to evaporate in certain contexts, either immediate linguistic context or the less immediate discourse context, or in circumstances where contrary assumptions are made”. (Ibid: 186)

“Defeasibility of presupposition is just another example of context sensitivity”  
(Verschueren, 1999:29)

Levinson (1981: 187-190) distinguishes the following cases of discourse contexts where presuppositions evaporate:

A simple example of defeasibility is provided by a certain asymmetry to do with the factive verb (know). In sentences where (know) has second or third person subjects, the complement is presupposed to be true, as in (5). But where the subject is first person and the verb is negated, the presupposition is clearly fails; thus (6) does not presuppose (7):

- 5- John doesn't know that Bill came.
- 6- I don't know that Bill came.
- 7- Bill came.

The reason of course is that the presupposition that the speaker knows (7) is precisely what the sentence denies, and such denials override contradictory presuppositions. Another example with (before-clauses); propositions expressed by (before-clauses) are generally presupposed. Hence if we say (8) we have communicated that we know (9):

- 8- Sue cried before she finished her thesis.
- 9- Sue finished her thesis.

But compare (10):

- 10- Sue died before she finished her thesis.

Which certainly does not presuppose (9), but rather conveys that (Sue never finished her thesis). Thus in (10) the presupposition seems to drop out. The reason for this seems to be the following: the statement of (10) asserts that the event of Sue's death precedes the (anticipated) event of her finishing her thesis; since we generally hold that people (and we assume that Sue is a person) do not do things after they die. It follows that she could not have finished her thesis; this deduction from the entailments of the sentence together with background assumptions about mortals, clashes with the presupposition (9) ; the



presupposition is therefore abandoned in this context, or set of background beliefs. Again, presuppositions prove to be defeasible.

This sensitivity to background assumptions about the world seems to be something quite general about presuppositions, and not some peculiar property of those due to (before-clauses).

Another kind of contextual defeasibility arises in certain kinds of discourse contexts. For example, recollect that a cleft sentence like (11) is held to presuppose (12):

11- It isn't Luke who will betray you.

12- Someone will betray you.

Now consider the following argument that proceeds by elimination:

13- You say that someone in this room will betray you. Well may be so. But it won't be Luke who will betray you, it won't be Paul, it won't be Mathew, and it certainly won't be John. Therefore no one in this room is actually going to betray you.

Here each of the cleft sentences (*it won't be Luke, etc.*) should presuppose that there will be someone who will betray the addressee. But the whole purpose of the utterance of (13) is, of course, to persuade the addressee that no one will betray him, as stated in the conclusion. So the presupposition is again defeated; it was adopted as a counterfactual assumption to argue to the untenability of such an assumption.

A slightly different kind of discourse context can also lead to the evaporation of presuppositions, namely where evidence for the truth of the presupposition is being weighed and rejected. For example, consider (14):

14- A: Well we've simply got to find out if Serge is a KGB infiltrator.

B: Who if anyone would know?

C: The only person who would know for sure is Alexis; I've talked to him and he isn't aware that Serge is on the KGB payroll. So I think can be trusted.

The sentence (15) in the exchange in (14) should presuppose (16), for (*be aware that*) is a factive predicate which presupposes the truth of its complement (i.e.16).

15- He isn't aware that Serge is on the KGB payroll.

16- Serge is on the KGB payroll.

However, the point of C's utterance in (14) is to argue that since (15) is true, (16) is probably false. So once again a specific discourse context can override a presuppositional inference. There are a number of further kinds of discourse setting that can have similar effects.

So far it is shown that some of the core examples of presuppositional phenomena are subject to presupposition cancellation in certain kinds of contexts, namely:

- a- *Where it is common knowledge that the presupposition is false, the speaker is not assumed to be committed to the truth of the presupposition.*
- b- *Where what is said, taken together with background assumptions, is inconsistent with what is presupposed, the presuppositions are cancelled, and are not assumed to be held by the speaker.*
- c- *In certain kinds of discourse contexts, e.g. the construction of reductio arguments or the presentation of evidence against some possibility or assumption, presuppositions can systematically fail to survive.*

*(Levinson, ibid:190)*

Levinson (ibid) argues that “in addition to such cases, there are also many kinds of intra-sentential cancellation or suspension of presuppositions. For example, bearing in mind that (17) presupposes (18), note that when we embed or conjoin (17) in the range of sentences that follow, (17) cannot be a presupposition of the resulting complex sentences:

- 17- John didn't manage to pass his exams.
- 18- John tried to pass his exams.
- 19- John didn't manage to pass his exams, in fact he didn't even tried.
- 20- John didn't manage to pass his exams, if indeed he even tried.
- 21- Either John never tried to pass his exams, or he tried but he never managed to pass them.
- 22- John didn't manage to pass his exams; he got through without even trying.

But the problems raised here best dealt with in conjunction with the general problem of how presuppositions of component sentences behave when these components are part of complex and compound sentences (the projection problem).

### **2.3.2 The projection Problem:**

“Frege held that the meanings of sentences are compositional i.e. that the meaning of the whole expression is a function of the meaning of its parts. It was originally suggested by Langendoen and Savin that this was true of presuppositions too, and moreover that the set of presuppositions of the complex whole is the simple sum of the presuppositions of the parts, i.e. if (So) is complex sentence containing sentences (S1), (S2) ... (Sn) as constituents. Then the presuppositions of (S0) = the presuppositions of (S1) + the presuppositions of (S2) + ... + the presupposition of (Sn). But such a simple solution to the presuppositions of complex sentences is far from correct, and it has proved in fact extremely difficult to formulate a theory that will predict correctly which presuppositions of component clauses will in fact be inherited by the complex whole. This compositional problem is known as the projection

problem for presuppositions, and the particular behaviour of presuppositions in complex sentences turns out to be the really distinctive characteristic of presuppositions". (Levinson, 1983:191)

Karttunen (1973:173) defines "the projection problem" as follows: "the term refers to the question of how presuppositions of a complex sentence are determined by the presupposition of the clauses it contains".

Yule (1996:133) defines it as "the problem of the presupposition of a simple structure not surviving when part of a more complex structure".

According to Levinson (1983:191) "there are two sides of the projection problem. On the one hand, presuppositions survive in linguistic contexts where entailments cannot (i.e. the presupposition of component sentences are inherited by the whole complex sentence where the entailments of these components would not be). On the other hand, presuppositions disappear in other contexts where one might expect them to survive, and where entailments would".

Levinson (ibid: 191-3) distinguishes these peculiar survival properties; the first and most obvious kind of contexts in which presuppositions survive while entailments do not survive, is the contexts where presuppositions are being under negation. One may, but need not, take this as a defining characteristic of presuppositions. Thus (23) could be held to presuppose (24) and entails (25):

23- The chief constable arrested three men.

24- There is a chief constable.

25- The chief constable arrested two men.

If we negate (23), as in (26), the entailment (25) does not survive, but the presupposition (24) does:

26- The chief constable didn't arrest three men.

Similarly, Presuppositions survive in other kinds of contexts in which entailments do not. One such is model contexts, i.e. embedding under model operators like *possible; there is a chance that* and so on. Thus (27) intuitively continues to presuppose (24):

27- It's possible that the chief constable arrested three men.

But (27) certainly does not entail (25), because one cannot logically infer from the mere possibility of a state of affairs that any part of it is actual.

This survival in model contexts will turn out to be an extremely important fact, and it is worth noting that the same behaviour occurs under, for example, denoting modalities like those expressed by *ought, should* and the like. Hence (28) presupposes (24) but does not entail (25), just like (27):

28- The chief constable ought to have arrested three men.

A rather different set of contexts in which presuppositions distinguish themselves by the ability to survive, are the compound sentences formed by the connectives *and*, *or*, *if...then* and their equivalents. Take for example (29):

29- The two thieves were caught again last night.

Which entails, inter alia, (30) and presupposes (31) by virtue of the iterative *again*:

30- A thief was caught last night.

31- The two thieves had been caught before.

Now embed (29) in the antecedent of a conditional as in (32):

32- If the two thieves were caught again last night, P.C. Katch will get an honourable mention.

Here (30) is not an entailment of (32), but the presupposition (31) survives unscathed. Similarly, when (29) is embedded in disjunction, its presuppositions but not its entailment survive:

33- Either the two thieves were caught again last night, or P.C. Katch will be losing his job.

“There are other environments in which it could be claimed presuppositions survive in a special way. Karttunen (1973), for example, lists a large set of complement-taking verbs or sentential operators, which he calls *holes* because they allow presuppositions to ascend to become presuppositions of the complex whole, where entailment would be blocked”. (Levinson, *ibid*)

Karttunen (1973:173) believes that “an adequate solution to the projection problem makes it necessary to distinguish between three different types of complementizable predicates, which he informally calls *“plugs”*, *“holes”* and *“filters”*.”

Karttunen (*Ibid*: 174) states that the three groups of predicates that we need to distinguish are characterized as follows:

***Plugs:** predicates which block off all the presuppositions of the complement sentence;*

***Holes:** predicates which let all the presuppositions of the complement sentence become presuppositions of the matrix sentence;*

***Filters:** predicates which, under certain conditions, cancel some of the presuppositions of the complement.*

The first group, *plugs*, contains verbs that are commonly called “verbs of saying” or “performatives” such as (*say, mention, tell, ask, promise, warn, request, order, accuse, criticize,*

*blame, etc.*). And verbs of propositional attitude, such as (*think, believe, doubt, suspect, fear, dream, imagine, etc.*). (ibid)

The class of **holes** contains verbs like (*know, regret, understand, surprise, be significant, begin, stop, continue, manage, avoid, be able, be possible, force, prevent, hesitate, seem, be probable, etc.*). The group includes all factives, aspectual verbs and implicatives. (ibid: 175)

The third group of complementizable predicates, **filters**, contains only logical connectives (if ... *then, and, either...or, etc.*). (ibid: 176)

Levinson (1983: 193-6) characterizes the second side of the projection problem; namely the way in which presuppositions of lower clauses sometimes fail to be inherited by the whole complex sentence. In other words, presuppositions are sometimes defeasible by virtue of intra-sentential context as follows:

Firstly; The most straightforward way in which such disappearances occur is where the presuppositions of a sentence are overtly denied in a co-ordinate sentence, as for example in:

34- John doesn't regret doing a useless PhD in linguistics because in fact he never did do one!

35- John didn't manage to pass his exams, in fact he didn't even try.

36- Let Comte de Berry claims to be the king of France, but of course there isn't any such kind anymore.

Obviously one can not do this with entailments on pain of direct contradiction:

37- \* John doesn't regret doing a useless PhD because in fact he does regret doing a useless PhD.

The possibility of denying one's own presuppositions is a fundamentally important property of presuppositional behaviour. (ibid: 194)

Secondly; in addition to the overt denial of presupposition there is the possibility of what Horn (1972) has called suspension. Here the use of a following if-clause can very naturally suspend the speaker's commitment to presupposition as illustrated by:

38- John didn't cheat again, if indeed he ever did.

39- Harry clearly doesn't regret being a CIA agent, if he actually ever was one.

Such suspension behaviour is probably just part of the special ways in which presuppositions behave in conditionals. (ibid: 195)

Thirdly; much more controversial is the other kind of blocking of the presuppositions of constituent parts of complex sentences, which appears to take place under certain verbs of propositional attitude like (*want, believe, imagine, dream*) and all the verbs of saying like (*say, tell, mumble, retort, etc.*). Apparently clear cases are the following:

- 40- Loony old Harry believes he's the king of France.  
 41- Nixon announced his regret that he did not know what his subordinates were up to.  
 42- The teacher told the students that even he had once made a mistake in linear algebra.

Which do not seem to have, respectively, the expectable presuppositions:

- 43- There is a present king of France.  
 44- Nixon didn't know what his subordinates were up to.  
 45- The teacher is the least likely person to make a mistake in linear algebra.

Levinson (ibid: 196) argues that “ in view of this behaviour Karttunen (1973) has dubbed such verbs *plugs*, because in contrast of *holes*, they block the presuppositions of lower sentences ascending to become presuppositions of the whole. However, it is far from clear that this is generally true. Consider for example:

- 46- a. The mechanic didn't tell me that my car would never run properly again  
       b. My car used to run properly.  
 47- a. Churchill said that he would never regret being tough with Stalin.  
       b. Churchill was tough with Stalin.

Hence, the (a) sentences continue to presuppose the (b) sentences despite the presence of *plugs*. So, if one believes in the existence of *plugs* one is forced to account for these apparently presuppositional inferences in another way. This is such an awkward solution, requiring non-presuppositional inferences to produce presupposition-mimicking inferences, that one has to conclude that the existence of *plugs* is very dubious indeed”.

Fourthly; the most troublesome aspect of the projection problem, namely the behaviour of presuppositions in complex sentences formed using the connectives (*and, or, if...then*) and then the related expressions that include (*but, alternatively, suppose that*) and many others. For example:

- 48- If John does linguistics, he will regret doing it.  
 49- John will do linguistics.

Here the consequent (second clause of the conditional) alone would presuppose (49), but the whole conditional does not clearly because the presupposition is mentioned in the first clause and is thus made hypothetical. This turns out to be completely general. Now consider:

- 50- Either John will not in the end do linguistics, or he will regret doing it.

Here again, the second clause alone presupposes (49), but the whole does not. The presupposition seems to be cancelled in this case because the alternative expressed in the first clause is the negation of the presupposition of the second clause. Once again, this is a completely general phenomenon. (Ibid)

Levinson (Ibid: 196-7) states that “because of this treatment of presuppositions in compounds formed by connectives, Karttunen (1973) dubbed the connectives *filters*: they let some presuppositions through but not others. He (Karttunen) stated the filtering conditions as follows:

- 1- *In a sentence of the form if p then q, (and also, perhaps, in a sentence of the form p and q) the presuppositions of its parts will be inherited by the whole unless q presupposes r and p entails r.*
- 2- *In a sentence of the form p or q, the presuppositions of the parts will be inherited by the whole unless q presupposes r and  $\sim p$  entails r.*

For those who think that presupposition and entailment are mutually exclusive i.e. that a sentence cannot both presuppose and entail the same proposition, then it also makes sense to set up filtering conditions for conjunctions. Thus, one might want to claim that (51) does not presuppose (49) but rather asserts or entails it:

51-John is going to do linguistics and he is going to regret it.

On this account, (51) fails to presuppose (49) because the first conjunct asserts what the second presupposes. It is not difficult to see that the filtering condition for conjunctions is identical to that for conditionals stated in (1). However, it is far from clear that this is a sensible way to view things: the doctrine of the mutual exclusivity of presupposition and entailment seems to be left over from the contrast in the philosophical literature between presupposition and assertion which has not proved of much use to linguistic analysis”.

Levinson (ibid: 197) adds “ the filtering conditions stated in (1) and (2) above are to a large extent observationally adequate, and any would-be theory of presupposition that cannot predict this kind of behaviour cannot be taken very seriously. One way in which they are not quite adequate, though, was noted by Karttunen (1974) himself: we have to allow for the fact that the first clause may be taken together with background information and that these premise (in conditionals) or the negation of the first clause plus the background assumption (in disjunctions) may then filter out a presupposition of the second clause by entailing it. This is the explanation of context-sensitivity of the presuppositions”.

## 2.4 Presupposition Triggers:

Presuppositions seem to be tied to particular words or aspects of surface structure in general. Such presupposition-generating linguistic items are called presupposition triggers. For example, consider (52) and its negation (53):

52- John, who is a good friend of mine, regrets that he stopped doing linguistics before he left Cambridge.

53- John, who is a good friend of mine, doesn't regret that he stopped doing linguistics before he left Cambridge.

There are quite a large set of inferences that seem to hold good both for (52) and for its negation (53), for example:

54- There is someone uniquely identifiable to speaker and addressee as "John".

55- John is a good friend of the speaker's.

56- John stopped doing linguistics before he left Cambridge.

57- John was doing linguistics before he left Cambridge.

58- John left Cambridge.

Since they are constant or invariant under negation, they are candidate presuppositions under Frege / Strawson definition. Each of the inferences can be tied back to particular words or constructions that give rise to them. Thus (54) seems to be tied to, or arise from, the use of the proper name (*John*); (55) seems to arise because relative clauses of this informative (non-restrictive) sort are not affected by the negation of a main verb outside the clause, and are thus preserved in their entirety under negation; and similarly for (58), which seems to arise from the fact that temporal clauses (*initiated by before, after, while, when, etc.*) are likewise unaffected by the negation of a main verb. The source of (56) is a little more opaque: it arises because (56) is the complement of a particular kind of the verb (called factive), here (*regret*); it appears that it simply makes no sense to talk about (*x regretting y*), or alternatively (*x not regretting y*), unless (*y*) is an event that has happened or will definitely happen. So the complement (*y*) is *presupposed* by both positive and negative sentences with main verbs in this class. The source of (57) is easier to locate: if one asserts that (*x stopped Ving*), then one presupposes that (*x*) had been (*Ving*), an inference shared by the assertion that (*x has not stopped Ving*). So the verb (*stop*) is responsible for the presupposition (57). (Levinson, *ibid*: 1979-180)

Levinson (*ibid*: 181-5) lists the following selection of the presupposition triggers which he quotes from Karttunen (n.d.) (the examples provide positive and negative versions separated from by (/), the symbol ((>>)) stands for presupposes) :

### A- Definite descriptions:

59- John saw/didn't see ***the man with two heads***.



- >> There exists a man with two heads.
- B- Factive verbs: regret, aware, realize, odd, etc. and some further factive predicates; know, be sorry that, be proud that, be indifferent that, be glad that, be sad that, etc:
- 60- It was **odd**/it wasn't **odd** how proud he was.  
>> He was proud.
- C- Implicative verbs: manage, forget, etc., and some further implicative predicates; (X happened to V >> X didn't plan or intend to V), (X avoided Ving >> X was expected to, or usually did, or ought to V), etc:
- 61- John **forgot**/didn't **forget** to lock the door.  
>> John ought to have locked, or intended to lock the door.
- D- Change of state verbs: stop, begin, continue, start, finish, carry on, cease, take ( as in x took y from z >> y was at/in/with z), leave, enter, come, go, arrive, etc:
- 62- Kissinger **continued**/ didn't **continue** to rule the world.  
>> Kissinger had been ruling the world.
- E- Iteratives: again, anymore, return, another time, to come back , restore, repeat, for the nth time ,etc:
- 63- You can't get gobstoppers **anymore**.  
>> You once could get gobstoppers.
- F- Verbs of judging: accuse, criticize, etc., this kind of implication is, arguably, not really presuppositional at all; for, unlike other presuppositions, the implications are not attributed to the speaker, so much as to the subject of the verb of judging:
- 64- Agatha **accused**/didn't **accuse** Ian of plagiarism.  
>> (Agatha thinks) plagiarism is bad.
- G- Temporal clause: before, while, since, after, during, whenever, as ( as in "as John was getting up, he slipped") :
- 65- **While** Chomsky was revolutionizing linguistics, the rest of social science was/wasn't asleep.  
>> Chomsky was revolutionizing linguistics.
- H- Cleft sentences:
- 66- It was/wasn't Henry that kissed Rosie.  
>> Someone kissed Rosie.
- 67- What John lost/didn't lose was his wallet.  
>> John lost something.

Sentence (66) exhibits what is known as the cleft-construction (cf. unclefted *Henry kissed Rosie*), (67) what is known as the pseudo-cleft construction (cf. unclefted *John lost his wallet*). Both constructions seem to share approximately the same presuppositions, and share, in addition, a further presupposition that the focal element (*Henry* in (66) and *his wallet* in (67)) is the only element to which the predicate applies.

- I- Implicit clefts with stressed constituents: the particular presuppositions that seem to arise from the two cleft constructions seem also to be triggered simply by heavy stress on a constituent, as illustrated by the following examples (where upper-case characters indicate contrastive stress) :
- 68- Linguistics was/wasn't invented by **CHOMSKY**.  
 >> Someone invented linguistic. (cf. it was/wasn't Chomsky that invented linguistic).
- 69- John did/didn't compete in the **OLYMPICS**.  
 >> John did compete somewhere. (cf. It was/wasn't in the Olympics that John competed).
- J- Comparisons and contrasts: comparisons and contrasts may be marked by stress (or by other prosodic means), by particles like too, back, in return, or by comparative constructions:
- 70- Mary called Adolph a male chauvinist, and then **HE** insulted **HER**.  
 >> For Mary to call Adolph a male chauvinist would be to insult him.
- 71- Adolph called Mary a valkyrie, and she complimented him **back/in return/too**.  
 >> To call someone (or at least Mary) a valkyrie is to compliment them.
- 72- Carol is/isn't a **better linguist than Barbara**.  
 >> Barbra is a linguist.
- 73- Jimmy is/isn't **as unpredictably gauche as Billy**.  
 >> Billy is unpredictably gauche.
- K- Non-restrictive relative clauses: note that there are two major kinds of relative clauses in English, those that restrict or delimit the noun phrase they modify (restrictive as in *only the boys who are tall can reach the cupboard*) and those that provide additional parenthetical information (non-restrictive as in *Hillary who climbed Everest in 1953, was the greatest explorer of our day*). The latter kind is not affected by the negation of the main verb outside the relative clause and thus gives rise to presuppositions:
- 74- The proto-Harrappans, who flourished 2800-2650 B.C. were/were not great temple builders.  
 >> The proto-Harrappans, who flourished 2800-2650 B.C.
- L- Counterfactual conditionals:
- 75- **If Hannibal had only had twelve more elephants**, the Romance languages would/would not this day exist.  
 >> Hannibal didn't have twelve more elephants.
- 76- **If the notice had only said 'mine-field' in English** as well as Welsh, we would/would never have lost poor Llewellyn.  
 >> The notice didn't say mine-field in English.

M- Questions: they generally share the presuppositions of their assertive counterparts. However, interrogative forms themselves introduce further presupposition, of a rather different kind. It is necessary to distinguish different types of questions: *yes/no questions* will generally have vacuous presuppositions, being the disjunction of their possible answers, as in (77). These are the only kinds of presuppositions of questions that are invariant under negation. *Alternative questions*, as in (78), presuppose the disjunction of their answers, but in this case non-vacuously. *Wh-questions* introduce the presuppositions obtained by replacing the WH-word by the appropriate existentially quantified variables, e.g. *who by someone, where by somewhere, how by somehow, etc.*, as in (79). These presuppositions are not invariant to negation :

77- Is there a professor of linguistics at MIT?

>> Either there is a professor of linguistics at MIT or there isn't.

78- Is Newcastle in England or is it in Australia?

>> Newcastle is in England or Newcastle is in Australia.

79- Who is the professor of linguistics at MIT?

>> Someone is the professor of linguistics at MIT.

Levinson (ibid: 184-5) discusses that “the above list contains perhaps the core of the phenomena that are generally considered presuppositional. However it is important to bear in mind that any such list is crucially dependent on one’s definition of presupposition. For example, taking constancy under negation alone as the definitional criterion one would include phenomena like those immediately below, even though these would probably be better accounted for under different aspects of pragmatic theory, as indicated the rubrics in the parentheses after each example (where >>? Stands for ‘putatively presupposes’):

80- Do/don’t close the door.

>>? The door is open (felicity condition on requests)

81- Vous etes/n’etes pas le professeur.

>>? The addressee is socially superior to or non-familiar with the speaker (conventional implicature).

82- The planet Pluto is/isn’t larger than Ceres.

>>? s the speaker believes the proposition expressed (the maxim of quality, or alternatively, sincerity condition on assertions).

Or suppose instead we abandon constancy under negation as the acid test of presuppositionhood (as Karttunen 1973 advised), substituting behaviour in say (*if...then*) clauses, then we might be led to claim that certain particles like (*only, even, just*) are presupposition-triggers. The grounds would be that, even though they do not yield inferences that survive negation, the inferences do survive in conditional contexts where entailments do not, as in illustrated below:

83- If *only* Harry failed the exam, it must have been easy.

>>? Harry failed the exam.

(cf. if **only** Harry didn't fail the exam, it must have been easy

>>? Harry didn't fail).

84- If **even** Harry didn't cheat, the exam must have been easy.

>>? Harry is the most likely person to cheat.

(cf. if **even** Harry cheated, the exam must have been easy.

>>? Harry is the least likely person to cheat).

85- If I **just** caught the train, it was because I ran.

>>? I almost didn't catch the train.

(cf. if I **just** didn't catch the train, it was because I ran.

>>? I almost did catch the train).

Levinson thinks that “the isolation of the range phenomenon thus depends crucially on the definition of presupposition adopted. But any theory of presupposition might reasonably be required to handle at least the majority of the cases listed in above.

## 2.5 Types of presuppositions:

Yule (1996:27-30) indicates that “ in the analysis of how speaker's assumptions are typically expressed, presupposition has been associated with the use of a large number of words, phrases, and structures ”.Yule considers these linguistic forms as indicators of potential presuppositions, which can only become actual presuppositions in contexts with speakers. Basing on such indicators, Yule presents the following types of presupposition:

- 1- **Existential Presupposition:** The existential presupposition is not only assumed to be present in possessive constructions (for example, your car >> you have a car), but more generally in any definite noun phrase. By using any of the expressions like (the king of Sweden, the cat, the girl next door, the counting crows), the speaker is assumed to be committed to the existence of the entities named

Existential presupposition is “an assumption that someone or something, identified by use of a noun phrase, does exist”. (ibid: 129)

- 2- **Factive Presupposition:** a number of verbs such as (know, realize, regret, etc.) as well as phrases involving (be) with ( aware, odd, glad, etc.) have factive presuppositions , in that the presupposed information followed by such verbs can be treated as a fact and thus, is described as a factive presupposition , for example:
  - 86- Everybody knows that John is gay. (>> John is gay)
  - 87- She didn't realize he was ill. (>> he was ill)
  - 88- We regret telling him. (>> we told him)

Hence, Factive presupposition is defined as “the assumption that information stated after certain words, e.g. (know), (regret) is true”. (ibid: 130)

- 3- Lexical Presupposition:** there are a number of forms which may be best treated as the source of lexical presupposition. Generally speaking, in lexical presupposition, the use of one form with its asserted meaning is conventionally interpreted with the presupposition that another (non-asserted) meaning is understood. Each time you say that someone “managed” to do something, the asserted meaning is that the person succeeded in some way. When you say that someone “didn’t manage”, the asserted meaning is that the person did not succeed. In both cases, however, there is a presupposition (non-asserted) that the person “tried” to do that something. So “managed” is conventionally interpreted as *asserting* “succeeded” and *presupposing* “tried”. Other examples, involving the lexical item (stop, start, again, etc.) are presented with their presuppositions in following examples:

89- He stopped smoking. (>>he used to smoke)

90- They started complaining. (>> they weren’t complaining before)

91- You are late again. (>> you are late before)

In the case of lexical presupposition, the speaker’s use of a particular expression is taken to presuppose another (unstated) concept, whereas in the case of a factive presupposition, the use of a particular expression is taken to presuppose the truth of the information that is stated after it.

Lexical presupposition is defined as “the assumption that, in using one word, the speaker can act as if another meaning (word) will be understood”. (ibid: 131)

- 4- Structural Presupposition:** in this case, certain sentence structures have been analyzed as conventionally and regularly presupposing that part of the structure is already assumed to be true. We might say that speakers can use such structures to treat information as presupposed (i.e. assumed to be true) and hence to be accepted as true by listener. For example, the **WH-question** construction in English as shown in (92) and (93), is conventionally interpreted with the presupposition that the information after the **WH-**form (i.e. “when” and “where”) is already known to be the case:

92- When did he leave? (>> he left)

93- Where did you buy the bike? (>> you bought the bike)

The type of presupposition illustrated in (92, 93) can lead listeners to believe that information presented is necessarily true, rather than just the presupposition of the person asking the question. For example, suppose that you are standing at an intersection one evening. You didn’t notice whether the traffic signal had turned to red before a car went through the intersection. The car was immediately involved in a crash. You were witness to the crash and later you are asked the question in (94):

94- How fast was the car going when it ran the red light?

If you answer the question as asked (just answer the question!) and estimate the speed of the car, then you would appear to be accepting the truth of the presupposition (i.e. >> the car ran the red light). Such structurally-based presuppositions may present subtle ways of making information that the speaker believes appear to be what the listener should believe.

Structural presupposition is defined as “the assumption that part of a structure contains information being treated as already known”. (ibid: 135)

So far we have considered contexts in which presuppositions are assumed to be true. There are, however, examples of non-factive presuppositions associated with a number of verbs in English:

**5- Non-factive Presupposition:** is the one that is assumed not to be true. Verbs like (dream, imagine, pretend, etc.), as shown in (95), are used with the presupposition that what follows is not true:

95- I dreamed I was rich. (>>I wasn't rich)

96- We imagined we were in Hawaii. (>> we were not in Hawaii)

97- He pretends to be ill. (>> he is not ill)

No-factive presupposition can be defined as “the assumption that certain information, as presented, is not true”. (ibid: 132)

**6- Counterfactual Presupposition:** meaning that what is presupposed is not true, but is the opposite of what is true, or contrary to facts. A conditional structure of the type shown in (98), is generally called a counterfactual conditional, presupposes that the information in the **if-clause** is not true at the time of utterance:

98- If you were my friend, you would have helped me. (>> you are not my friend).

Counterfactual presupposition can be defined as “the assumption that certain information is the opposite of true”. (ibid: 128)

Yule (ibid: 30) states that “The existence of non-factive presuppositions is part of the projection problem”.

Yule (ibid: 30) sites the following table which summarizes the indicators of potential presuppositions discussed so far:

**Table (1) Potential Presuppositions**

Type	Example	Presupposition
Existential	The x	>> <i>x exists</i>
factive	I regret leaving	>> <i>I left</i>
Non-factive	He pretended to be happy	>> <i>he wasn't happy</i>
lexical	He managed to escape	>> <i>he tried to escape</i>
structural	When did she die?	>> <i>she died</i>
counterfactual	If I weren't ill	>> <i>I am ill</i>

### ***Section Three: Procedures***

#### **3.1 Test Construction**

The researcher has conducted a test about the subject of presupposition includes one question; a multiple - choice question, contains (17) items, one mark is devoted for each item. (See the appendix)

#### **3.2 Population and Sample Selection**

The population of the present study is fourth -year students from the department of Translation, College of Arts, University of Al-Mustansiriya, during the academic year (2011-2012). The reason behind the selection of this sample is that they have been introduced to the subject of presupposition (during their study in the third year), i.e. they should have a clear idea about it. The sample is consisted of (37) students.

#### **3.3 Test Validity**

The test gives the concept of validity when it measures what is intended to measure (Madsen, 1983:178). In order to insure the face validity of this test, it was exposed to a jury<sup>1</sup> of experts to provide the researcher with their opinions in verifying the items of the test, checking its validity and suitability. The jury agreed upon its validity and suitability.

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<sup>1</sup> The jury members are alphabetically listed below

- 1- Asst. Prof. Abdul Kareem Fadil , ph.D, College of Education Ibin Rushed , University of Baghdad.
- 2- Asst. Prof. Istiqlal Hassan Al- Mansoury , ph.D, College of Arts , University of Al-Mustansiriya.
- 3- Instructor Ahmed Qadoury Abed, M.A, College of Arts, University of Al-Mustansiriya.
- 4- Instructor Samir Salih Mahdi, PhD, College of Arts, University of Al-Mustansiriya.
- 5- Instructor Zaynab Eliwi , M.A , College of Arts , University of Al-Mustansiriya
- 6- Asst. Inst. Dia Abdulla Sulaibi, M.A , College of Arts , University of Al-Mustansiriya

### Section Four: Analysis, Results and conclusions

#### 4.1 Analysis and Results:

The researcher has counted the mean and the standard deviation of the group, and when it is compared with the theoretical mean which is (8.5) by using the T-test for one sample, it is found that the computed value reaches to (0.040) which is less than the tabulated value which is (2.262) at level of significance (0.05) and degree of freedom (37).

The null hypothesis states that there is no statistical significance difference between the mean of the sample and the theoretical mean. This proves that the level of the students is medium in the test (see tables (2-5) below).

#### T-Test

(Table 2) One-Sample Statistics

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
TOTAL	37	8.5135	2.07661	.34139

(Table 3) One- Sample Test

	Test Value= 8.5					
	t	df	Sig.(2.tailed)	Mean difference	95% Confidence Interval Of the difference	
					Lower	Upper
TOTAL	.040	36	.969	.0135	-.6789	.7059

#### T-Test

(Table 4) Group Statistics

sex	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
TOTAL male	11	7.1818	1.32802	.40041
female	26	9.0769	2.09615	.41109

(Table 5) Independent Sample Test

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances	
		F	Sig.
TOTAL	Equal variances assumed	1.920	.175
	Equal variances not assumed		

To count the significance of the difference in the test between the students according to the variable of sex, the T-test is used for two different samples. The computed T-value is (2.761) which is more than the T-tabulated value which is (2.262) at level of significance (0.05) and degree of freedom (35). The null hypothesis is refused here and the substituted theory is adopted, this proves that there are statistical significance differences between the mean of degrees of



males and the mean of the degrees of females. This difference is real and it is in the side of the females (see tables (6-42) and charts (1-17) below).

**(Table 6) Independent Sample Test**

		t-test for Equality of Means			
		t	Df	Sig.(2-tailed)	Mean Difference
TOTAL	Equal variances assumed	-2.761	35	.009	-1.8951
	Equal variances not assumed	-3.302	29.210	.003	-1.8951

**(Table 7) Independent Sample Test**

		t-test for Equality of Means			
		Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference		Upper
			Lower		
TOTAL	Equal variances assumed	.68645	-3.28867		-.50154
	Equal variances not assumed	.57387	-3.06843		-.72178

**Crosstabs**

**(Table 8) Case Processing Summary**

	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	percent	N	percent	N	percent
Sex*Item1	37	100%	0	0%	37	100%
Sex*Item2	37	100%	0	0%	37	100%
Sex*Item3	37	100%	0	0%	37	100%
Sex*Item4	37	100%	0	0%	37	100%
Sex*Item5	37	100%	0	0%	37	100%
Sex*Item6	37	100%	0	0%	37	100%
Sex*Item7	37	100%	0	0%	37	100%
Sex*Item8	37	100%	0	0%	37	100%
Sex*Item9	37	100%	0	0%	37	100%
Sex*Item10	37	100%	0	0%	37	100%
Sex*Item11	37	100%	0	0%	37	100%
Sex*Item12	37	100%	0	0%	37	100%
Sex*Item13	37	100%	0	0%	37	100%
Sex*Item14	37	100%	0	0%	37	100%
Sex*Item15	37	100%	0	0%	37	100%
Sex*Item16	37	100%	0	0%	37	100%
Sex*Item17	37	100%	0	0%	37	100%

Sex\*Item 1




chart 1

Crosstab ( table 9 ) count

Sex	Item1		Total
	false	true	
male	4	7	11
Female	12	14	26
Total	16	21	37

( Table 10 ) Chi-Square Tests:

	Value	DF.	Asymp sig. (2-sided)	Exact sig. (2 sided)	Exact sig. (1 sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.302	1	.583		
Continuity Correction	.035	1	.852		
Likelihood Ratio	.305	1	.581		
Fisher's Exact Test				.723	.429
Linear-by-Linear Association	.294	1	.588		
N of valid cases	37				

Sex\*Item 2




chart 2

Crosstab ( table 11 ) count

sex	Item2		Total
	false	true	
male	7	4	11
Female	11	15	26
Total	18	19	37

( Table 12 ) Chi-Square Tests:

	Value	DF.	Asymp sig. (2-sided)	Exact sig. (2 sided)	Exact sig. (1 sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	1.408	1	.235		
Continuity Correction	.683	1	.408		
Likelihood Ratio	1.419	1	.233		
Fisher's Exact Test				.295	.205
Linear-by-Linear Association	1.370	1	.242		
N of valid cases	37				

Sex\*Item 3




chart 3

Crosstab ( table 13 ) count

Sex	Item3		Total
	false	true	
Male	10	1	11
Female	13	13	26
Total	23	14	37

( Table 14 ) Chi-Square Tests:

	Value	DF.	Asymp sig. (2-sided)	Exact sig. (2 sided)	Exact sig. (1 sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	5.500	1	.019		
Continuity Correction	3.898	1	.048		
Likelihood Ratio	6.336	1	.012		
Fisher's Exact Test				.027	.020
Linear-by-Linear Association	5.351	1	.021		
N of valid cases	37				

Sex\*Item 4




chart 4

Crosstab (table 15) count

Sex	Item4		Total
	false	true	
male	10	1	11
Female	17	9	26
Total	27	10	37

(Table 16) Chi-Square Test:

	Value	DF.	Asymp. sig. (2-sided)	Exact sig. (2 sided)	Exact sig. (1 sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	2.553	1	.110		
Continuity Correction	1.423	1	.233		
Likelihood Ratio	2.937	1	.087		
Fisher's Exact Test				.224	.114
Linear-by-Linear Association	2.484	1	.155		
N of valid cases	37				

Sex\*Item 5




chart 5

Crosstab (table 17) count

Sex	Item5		Total
	false	true	
male	9	2	11
Female	10	16	26
Total	19	18	37

(Table 18) Chi-Square Test:

	Value	DF.	Asymp. sig. (2-sided)	Exact sig. (2 sided)	Exact sig. (1 sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	5.816	1	.016		
Continuity Correction	4.210	1	.040		
Likelihood Ratio	6.188	1	.013		
Fisher's Exact Test				.029	.019
Linear-by-Linear Association	5.659	1	.017		
N of valid cases	37				

Sex\*Item 6




chart 6

Crosstab (table 19) count

Sex	Item6		Total
	false	true	
male	8	3	11
Female	9	17	26
Total	17	20	37

(Table 20) Chi Square Test:

	Value	DF.	Asymp. sig. (2-sided)	Exact sig. (2 sided)	Exact sig. (1 sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	4.521	1	.033		
Continuity Correction	3.116	1	.078		
Likelihood Ratio	4.517	1	.032		
Fisher's Exact Test				.069	.038
Linear by Linear Association	4.399	1	.036		
N of valid cases	37				

Sex\*Item 7




chart 7

Crosstab ( table 21 ) count

Sex	Item7		Total
	false	true	
male	8	3	11
Female	19	7	26
Total	27	10	37

( Table 22 ) Chi-Square Tests:

	Value	DF	Asymp. sig. (2-sided)	Exact sig. (2 sided)	Exact sig. (1 sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.000	1	.983		
Continuity Correction	.000	1	1.000		
Likelihood Ratio	.000	1	.983		
Fisher's Exact Test				1.000	.639
Linear-by-Linear Association	.000	1	.983		
N of valid cases	37				

Sex\*Item 8




chart 8

Crosstab ( table 23 ) count

Sex	Item8		Total
	false	true	
male	8	3	11
Female	18	8	26
Total	26	21	37

( Table 24 ) Chi-Square Tests:

	Value	DF	Asymp. sig. (2-sided)	Exact sig. (2 sided)	Exact sig. (1 sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.045	1	.832		
Continuity Correction	.000	1	1.000		
Likelihood Ratio	.046	1	.831		
Fisher's Exact Test				1.000	.580
Linear-by-Linear Association	.044	1	.834		
N of valid cases	37				

Sex\*Item 9




chart 9

Crosstab ( table 25 ) count

Sex	Item9		Total
	false	true	
male		11	11
Female	2	24	26
Total	2	35	37

( Table 26 ) Chi-Square Tests:

	Value	DF	Asymp. sig. (2-sided)	Exact sig. (2 sided)	Exact sig. (1 sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.895	1	.344		
Continuity Correction	.023	1	.880		
Likelihood Ratio	1.459	1	.227		
Fisher's Exact Test				1.000	.488
Linear-by-Linear Association	.870	1	.351		
N of valid cases	37				

Sex\*Item 10




chart 10

Crosstab (table 27) count

Sex	Item10		Total
	false	true	
male	6	5	11
Female	12	14	26
Total	18	19	37

(Table 28) Chi-Square Tests

	Value	DF.	Asymp. sig. (2-sided)	Exact sig. (2 sided)	Exact sig. (1 sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.218	1	.641		
Continuity Correction	.011	1	.915		
Likelihood Ratio	.218	1	.641		
Fisher's Exact Test				.728	.457
Linear-by-Linear Association	.212	1	.645		
N of valid cases	37				

Sex\*Item 11




chart 11

Crosstab (table 29) count

Sex	Item11		Total
	false	true	
male	9	2	11
Female	16	10	26
Total	25	12	37

(Table 30) Chi-Square Tests

	Value	DF.	Asymp. sig. (2-sided)	Exact sig. (2 sided)	Exact sig. (1 sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	1.451	1	.228		
Continuity Correction	.673	1	.412		
Likelihood Ratio	1.549	1	.213		
Fisher's Exact Test				.279	.209
Linear-by-Linear Association	1.411	1	.235		
N of valid cases	37				

Sex\*Item 12




chart 12

Crosstab (table 31) count

Sex	Item12		Total
	false	true	
male		11	11
Female	3	23	26
Total	3	34	37

(Table 32) Chi-Square Tests

	Value	DF.	Asymp. sig. (2-sided)	Exact sig. (2 sided)	Exact sig. (1 sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	1.381	1	.240		
Continuity Correction	.267	1	.606		
Likelihood Ratio	2.227	1	.136		
Fisher's Exact Test				.540	.335
Linear-by-Linear Association	1.344	1	.246		
N of valid cases	37				

Sex\*Item 13

Crosstab (table 33) count

Sex	Item13		Total
	false	true	
male	8	5	11
Female	19	7	26
Total	25	12	37




chart 13

(Table 34) Chi-Square Tests

	Value	DF.	Asymp. sig. (2-sided)	Exact sig. (2 sided)	Exact sig. (1 sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	1.211	1	.271		
Continuity Correction	.513	1	.474		
Likelihood Ratio	1.179	1	.278		
Fisher's Exact Test				.443	.235
Linear-by-Linear Association	1.179	1	.278		
N of valid cases	37				

Sex\*Item 14

Crosstab (table 35) count

Sex	Item14		Total
	false	true	
male	9	2	11
Female	17	9	26
Total	26	11	37




chart 14

(Table 36) Chi-Square Tests

	Value	DF.	Asymp. sig. (2-sided)	Exact sig. (2 sided)	Exact sig. (1 sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.999	1	.317		
Continuity Correction	.367	1	.544		
Likelihood Ratio	1.060	1	.303		
Fisher's Exact Test				.445	.278
Linear-by-Linear Association	.972	1	.324		
N of valid cases	37				

Sex\*Item 15

Crosstab (table 37) count

Sex	Item15		Total
	false	true	
male	9	2	11
Female	24	2	26
Total	33	4	37






chart 15

(Table 38) Chi-Square Tests

	Value	DF.	Asymp. sig. (2-sided)	Exact sig. (2 sided)	Exact sig. (1 sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.882	1	.348		
Continuity Correction	.130	1	.719		
Likelihood Ratio	.815	1	.367		
Fisher's Exact Test				.567	.341
Linear-by-Linear Association	.585	1	.354		
N of valid cases	37				



## 4.2 Conclusions

On the basis of the analysis and the results, the following findings have been drawn:

- 1- Fourth-year university students are able to recognize the English presupposition through the meaning of the linguistic triggers used to signal it. This proves the validity of the hypothesis.
- 2- The linguistic triggers play an important role in recognizing the presuppositions.
- 3- The performance of the female students in the test is better than the performance of the male students.
- 4- On the basis of the students' answers, it is found there are differences between the linguistic triggers that are used to signal the presuppositions in the degree of difficulty, some of them are difficult like the triggers (*forgot, accused, before-clause, someone, too, who-clause, who*) in items (4,7,8,11,13,14,15) ( see the appendix) which belong to the groups of implicative verbs, verbs of judging, temporal clauses, implicit-clefts, comparison and contrasts, non-restrictive relative clauses, and questions respectively , some are medium like the triggers (*John saw the man ..., regrets, I am glad it's over, stopped, again, what-clause*) in items (1,2,3,5,6,10) ( see the appendix) which belong to the groups of definite descriptions , factive verbs, factive predicates, change of state verbs, iteratives, and cleft-sentences respectively , and others are easy like the triggers (*it was ..., Carol is a better ..., if-clause, dreamed*) in the items (9,12,16,17) ( see the

appendix) which belong to the groups of cleft- sentences, comparison and contrast, counter-factual sentences, non-factive verbs respectively .

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**Appendix**

## The Test

Choose the presupposition from the two statements mentioned under each sentence: (1 mark for each item)

1- John saw the man with two heads. Presupposes:

a- John can see.

b- There exists a man with two heads.

2- Thomas regrets that Adam ate the apple. Presupposes:

a- The apple was eaten.

b- Adam ate the apple.

3- I am glad it's over. Presupposes:

a- It's over.

b- I am glad.

4- Mary forgot to lock the door. Presupposes:

a- Mary ought to have locked the door.

b- The door is open.

5- Henry stopped smoking. Presupposes:

a- Henry is sick.

b- Henry had been smoking.

6- The flying saucer didn't come again. Presupposes:

a- There is a flying saucer.

b- The flying saucer came before.

7- Agatha accused Ian with plagiarism. Presupposes:

a- (Agatha thinks) plagiarism is bad.

b- Ian is a bad person.

8- Before Strawson was even born, Frege noticed presuppositions. Presupposes:

a- Frege noticed presuppositions.

b- Strawson was born.

9- It was Henry that broke the window. Presupposes:

a- Someone broke the window.

b- The window is broken.

10- What John lost was his wallet. Presupposes:

a- The wallet is lost.

b- John lost something.

11- Linguistics was invented by Chomsky. Presupposes:

a- Someone invented linguistics.

b- Chomsky is an inventor.

12- Carol is a better linguist than Barbara. Presupposes:

a- Barbara is a linguist.

b-Carol is a good linguist.

13-Adolph called Marianne a valkyrie, and she complemented him too. Presupposes:

a-Marianne is a valkyrie.

b-To call someone a valkyrie is to complement her.

14-Hillary, who climbed Everest in 1953, was the greatest explorer of our day. Presupposes:

a-Hillary climbed Everest in 1953.

b-Hillary was the greatest explorer of our day.

15-who is the professor of linguistics at MIT? Presupposes:

a-Someone is the professor of linguistics at MIT.

b-There is a professor of linguistics at MIT.

16- If the notice had only said "mine field" in English as well as Welsh, we would never lost poor Llewellyn. Presupposes:

a- The notice didn't say "mine field" in English.

b- Llewellyn was lost.

17-I dreamed that I was rich. Presupposes:

a- I wasn't rich.

b- I was rich.